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Fred L. Ragsdale, Jr.*

The Taxation of Natural Resources
by Indian Tribes:
Merrion, a Comment
Federal Indian Law is in a period of transition, the contours of which
are as yet unclear. The foundations of Federal Indian Law established in
Johnson v. McIntosh,' Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,' and Worcester v.
Georgia,3 remained largely unquestioned for 127 years. Between Worcester and Williams v. Lee, 4 the Court examined the principle of Indian selfgovernment only once.' Recently, however, cases are being decided at a
pace that may be beyond the capacity of the interested parties and institutions to absorb. 6 The capacity to absorb the entire case, not simply the
holdings, is vital in Indian Affairs because of the importance that Supreme
Court decisions have in determining immediate policies and relationships
between the tribes, the states, and the United States.
The status of Indian Tribes in the American political system is almost
entirely the result of Supreme Court decisions. 7 The judiciary has appeared
to Indians, and history supports the appearance, to be the only branch of
Government willing to protect tribal rights. This protection has been
rendered even in the face of vitriolic opposition from the other two
branches. 8 Indians are cognizant of the judiciary's role, and this results
in cases involving issues of significance to Indians being followed as
avidly as professional football in Dallas.
When a significant case is decided, reprise of it travels to be assimilated
*Professor of Law, The University of New Mexico.
1. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
2. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
3. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
4. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
5. In United States v. Quiver, 214 U.S. 602 (1916), the Supreme Court held that a prosecution
for adultery was not included (1885) in the Major Crimes Act (23 Stat. 362, 385, codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1153) and therefore was a matter of tribal domestic law.
6. Since Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), the Supreme Court has decided approximately
45 Indian Cases. The approximation stems from an inability to define what constitutes an Indian
law issue.
7. See Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN L. REV.
500 (1969).
8. The most striking example is President Jackson's reputed response to the Cherokee cases.
While it is the subject of some debate as to whether Worcester v. Georgia was the case that caused
Jackson to reportedly retort, "He has made the law, now let him enforce it," there is little doubt
the Executive and Legislative branches did not take the law seriously. The Trail of Tears is ample
evidence, and today the tradition is being carried on. See H.R. 5494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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into a common knowledge of Indian law. This common knowledge is the
basis for discussion, strategy, and action by Indians and non-Indians.
Congressmen, bureaucrats, Governors, tribal lawyers, and tribal leaders
comment on the implications of a case too often on the barest understanding of the reasoning and holding. This results in a vulgate law. Too
often it is the vulgate law that is the basis for policy decisions. 9
Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe'" is the latest case to be absorbed
into the stream of common knowledge. Immediately after the opinion
came down, visions of wealth or ruin, depending on one's vantage point,
danced like Tchaikovsky's sugarplum fairies. Merrion would be the salvation of American Indians or the ruination of commerce with Indians."
Before discussing some of the implications of Merrion, it may be of
interest to explain why Indians are overjoyed by the holding. The recent
cases of Oliphant v. Suguamish Indian Tribe 2 and Montana v. United
States 3 caused Indians to question the faith that they had placed in the
Supreme Court as the principal protector of tribal powers. The Court in
Oliphant held that the tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
because it was the common understanding of all three branches of government that the tribe lacked this power as an attribute of political status.
In Montana, the Court held that the Crow Tribe could not regulate fishing
by non-Indians on non-Indian fee land even though the land was within
the exterior boundaries of the reservation.
Prior to Oliphant and Montana, there was a belief, or at least a fond
hope, that deviations from the dictate of John Marshall's "the state law
had no force" were aberrations. " To many Indians, these two cases meant
that the aberrations were to become the rule rather than the exception:
the feeling was that the court would restrict tribal power to the narrowest
possible focus-over Indians and tribal land. This fear was buttressed by
other cases, cases supporting tribal powers only when those powers were
being exercised on tribal land over member Indians."5
These cases engendered a fear of a Supreme Court backlash that the
9. The latest example of thoughtlessness is H.R. 5001, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), a bill to
authorize Indian tribes and states to make compacts. It is conceded by almost everyone that the
power to make compacts already exists. This bill would result in Congressional "approval," a
concept diametrically opposed to the principle of retained sovereignty.
10. 102 S.Ct. 894 (1982). Together with No. 80-15, Amoco Production Co. v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, also on Certiorarito the Supreme Court.
11.Leonard Atole, President of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, called the Merrion decision "the
brightest day in New Mexico." The CERT Report, Vol. 4, No. 2, Feb. 8, 1982, at 2, col. 2.
12. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
13. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
14. Worcester v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 561.
15. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 (1978).
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Court was abandoning tribal self-government. Merrion appeared to
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The Jicarilla Apache Tribe of New Mexico had enacted a severance
tax ordinance on oil and gas extracted from the reservation. 7 Non-Indian
lessees challenged the tax on a variety of grounds; millions of dollars
were at stake. The fears were not allayed in 1981 when the Supreme
Court upheld Montana's 30 percent severance tax on coal extracted from
federal land by private leases 8 and then ordered Merrion to be set over
for reargument in the next term.' 9 Therefore, when the decision came
down upholding the tribal position, the elation among Indians was understandable.
Merrion is the first case in which the Supreme Court has specifically
upheld the authority of an Indian tribe to impose taxes on minerals extracted from tribal land under leases between the tribe and private lessees
pursuant to federal law, although it is in line with other cases upholding
tribal taxing authority.2" In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation,2 the most recent of these cases, the Court
reaffirmed a broad principle:
The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of
sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal
law or necessary implications of their dependent status.22
Merrion upheld the tribal tax authority on the broad ground of inherent
sovereignty.
Thus, the views of the three federal branches of government, as well
as general principles of taxation, confirm that Indian tribes enjoy
authority to finance their government services through taxation of
non-Indians who benefit from those services. Indeed, the conception
16. See Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) and Washington
v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). While both cases
allowed a degree of state taxation on Indian reservations, they also upheld the tribes' right to tax.
See also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) which prohibited the State
of Arizona from imposing taxes on a variety of activities relating to timber, and Central Machinery
Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n., 448 U.S. 160 (1980), which prohibited the State of Arizona from
imposing taxes on transactions occurring on an Indian reservation. Both White Mountain and Central
Machinery were decided on the preemption doctrine.
17. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Ordinance No. 77-0-02 (1976), as amended by Ordinance No. 77-0195 (Apr. 23, 1977).
18. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
19. Merrion had been argued originally Mar. 30, 1981, then reargued Nov. 4, 1981, after Justice
O'Connor had been seated.
20. Supra note 16.
21. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
22. Id. at 152.
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of Indian sovereignty that 23this Court has consistently reaffirmed permits no other conclusion.
The dissent in Merrion24 would have found the Tribe without the power
to tax on the theory that tribal power to tax nonmembers doing business
on the reservation rests solely on the narrow ground of the tribe's long
recognized power to exclude outsiders from the reservation. The dissent
reasoned that since the leases gave the lessees the right to enter the
reservation, a right the tribe was bound to honor, the Jicarilla Apache
Tribe was without power to exclude the lessees from the reservation once
the leases had been executed, and therefore, powerless to impose the
severance taxes. The majority rejected that argument and upheld the tax
not only on the grounds of inherent tribal sovereignty, but also on the
separate grounds of the tribe's right to exclude outsiders from its reservation which was not surrendered by the tribe in negotiating its leases.
The Court also held that the tax did not violate the Interstate Commerce
Clause 25 because the clause was not applicable to Indian Tribes. However,
Justice Marshall then opined that even if the Interstate Commerce Clause
was applicable, the tribal tax did not violate the negative implications of
the clause.
But, even with this attempt to provide guidelines beyond the case in
controversy, two serious issues remain for Indian mineral taxation: What
is the power of the Secretary of the Interior in approving tribal tax ordinances, and what is the extent of state power to impose severance taxes
on an Indian reservation? The second issue, beyond the scope of the
opinion and this article, is now the most important issue remaining in
Indian mineral taxation. By determining that the Interstate Commerce
Clause and the dissent's theory of limited power to exclude were inaccurate or at least unnecessary statements of the law, Justice Marshall
seems to have drawn broad guidelines for determining tribal taxation
power over minerals.
The crucial issue in Merrion was not the Tribe's power to tax. As noted
earlier, the Court has recognized this power in every case raising the
issue. The crux was what effect the mineral leasing acts had on the power
when exercised against non-Indian lessees. 26 Did these Acts extinguish
the Tribe's inherent power to tax minerals? Petitioners argued that even
if the Tribe retained the inherent power to impose taxes on non-Indians,
23. 102 S. Ct. at 903.
24. Justice Stevens filed the dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist
joined.
25. U.S. Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 3.
26. The Jicarilla Apache Tribe leases were entered into under the Act of May 11, 1938, Ch. 198,
52 Stat. 347 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1976)) [hereinafter the Mineral Leasing Act of
1938 to distinguish from the plethora of other leasing statutes enacted beginning in 1891].
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severance taxes on oil and gas leases entered into pursuant to statutes
were preemptive of tribal taxes. It is a disingenuous argument. The
preemption, if any, would be for the benefit of Indians, not for the benefit
of the non-Indian lessees. The effect of preemption should not provide a
windfall to the non-Indian corporation at the expense of the tribe.
The Court addressed the argument of preemption:
This Act [Mineral Leasing Act of 1938], and the regulations promulgated by the Department of the Interior for its enforcement,
establish the procedures to be followed for leasing oil and gas interests
on tribal lands. However, the proviso to § 396b of the Act states that
"the foregoing provisions shall in no manner restrict the right of

tribes ...to lease lands for mining purposes ...inaccordance
with the provisions of any constitution and charteradopted by any
Indian tribe pursuant to sections 461, 462, 463, 464-475, 476-478,
and 479 of this title." (emphasis added) Therefore, this Act does not
prohibit the Tribe from imposing a severence tax on petitioners'
mining activities pursuant to its Revised Constitution, when both the
Revised Constitution and the ordinance authorizing the tax are approved by the Secretary.27
This neatly disposes of the preemption argument that the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1938 and other mineral leasing acts are not preemptive of tribal
inherent taxation power.
However, because the Court was addressing only the validity of the
Jicarilla ordinance, it was not necessary to elucidate fully the extent or
limit of the power of the Secretary of the Interior to approve tribal ordinances. Opponents of tribal taxation or perhaps the tribes themselves
may use the above quoted language to question the validity of tribal taxes
enacted by a tribe whose organic documents do not require Secretarial
approval.
In other words, opponents of tribal taxation may make the reasoning
error of affirming the antecedent to conclude that the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1938 does prohibit the severance tax when the ordinance is not
approved by the Secretary. To reason from the stated premise that the
Act would bar taxes levied under an ordinance not approved by the
Secretary of the Interior is an excellent example of the logical fallacy
Aristotle called "affirming the antecedent." 28 Affirming the antecedent
will not result in a valid statement unless the antecedent is inclusive of
a class that encompasses the subject. This must either be a given or known
from empirical knowledge.
27. 102 S. Ct. at 908.
28. ARISTOTLE, PRIOR AND POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 107 (J.Warrington ed. and trans.
1964).
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Example 1:
A. That Indian is a Chemehuevi.
B. That is not a Chemehuevi; that is not an Indian.
Statement A is a given premise that is demonstrably true. Statement B
which results from affirming the antecedent of Statement A is demonstrably false because one could be any of more than 300 tribes.
Example 2:
A. All Chemehuevis are Indians.
B. That is not an Indian; that is not a Chemehuevi.
Statement A again is demonstrably true. But the affirmation of the negative
in statement B is also true because Chemehuevi is a subclass of a class
of Indians, and to be a Chemehuevi, one must also be an Indian.
Example 3:
A. That Act
approved
B. That Act
approved

does not bar tribal mineral tax ordinances that are
by the Secretary.
does bar tribal mineral tax ordinances that are not
by the Secretary.

Assuming that statement A is true, it does not follow that statement B is
true. Statement B is true only if there exists a general Secretarial power
to approve all tribal mineral tax ordinances. A specific requirement in the
tribal constitution requiring Secretarial approval for tribal tax ordinances,
or the Act itself, creates in the Secretary of the Interior, a power to
approve all tribal mineral tax ordinances regardless of the general powers
of the Secretary or the nonexistence of a specific requirement in the tribe's
organic documents.
Justice Marshall's statement on the relationship between the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1938, Secretarial approval of the Revised Constitution,
and the severance tax ordinance must be placed in context to understand
why Secretarial approval is an issue in Merrion. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA)29 was intended to be voluntary; tribes could by
affirmative vote be excluded from the statute. "During the two-year period
during which tribes could accept or reject the IRA, 258 elections were
held. In these elections, 181 tribes (129,750 Indians) accepted the Act
and 77 tribes (86,365 Indians, including 45,000 Navajos) rejected it. The
IRA also applied to 14 groups of Indians who did not hold elections to
exclude themselves. Within 12 years, 161 constitutions and 131 corporate
charters had been adopted pursuant to the IRA." 3"
The Jicarilla Apache Tribe voted to be included in the IRA. In 1937,
29. 25 U.S.C. §461 (1976).
30. 70 MICH. L. REV. 955, 972 (1972).
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the Tribe adopted, and the Secretary of the Interior approved, a constitution. In 1968, the Tribe revised its constitution to allow inter alia
development of resources and to impose taxes on nonmembers. These
revisions were approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The severance
tax ordinance at issue was also approved by the Secretary.
The Jicarilla, in their Constitution, bound themselves in a relationship
with the Secretary of the Interior. In order for the tax ordinance to be
valid, they had to take both steps: revise the original documents and
submit the ordinance for approval. The approval of the Secretary was
required not only as a matter of federal law, but of Jicarilla law. Therefore,
Marshall's observation is correct.3" If the Jicarilla had omitted either step,
revision or approval, the ordinance would have been invalid.
IRA constitutions are often boiler plates.32 Most tribes that accepted
the IRA have adopted the Bureau of Indian Affair's model Constitution
and must go through the same process to assert power that had atrophied.
This places in the hands of the Secretary the power to approve those
necessary changes required by Constitutions.33
For example, the Crow Tribe of Montana is not an IRA tribe, but the
Constitution of the Tribe requires Secretarial approval for constitutional
amendments.34 In 1978, the Tribe submitted to the Bureau of Indian Affairs
a proposed constitutional amendment that would allow the Tribe to exercise its inherent power of taxation over non-Indians. 35 The Secretary
of the Interior has taken no action on the amendment although the reason
for failing to act appears to be procedural errors rather than ideological
opposition. However, for those tribes that do not have to submit ordinances for Secretarial approval, a different situation is presented.
As noted earlier, the tribes that elected to reject the IRA are not governed by the provisions of the Act. In most instances, these tribes do not
require Secretarial approval for their internal laws. 36 The Navajo Nation,
by far the largest tribe by almost every indicator, is governed without a
written constitution. The Navajos rejected the IRA in 1934 and have
spumed other federal offers to adopt an approved constitution.37
The Navajo Nation has imposed a series of taxes that are similar in
31. 102 S. Ct. at 900.
32. K. PHILIP, J. COLLIERS, CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM 164 (1977).
33. 25 U.S.C. §476 (1976).
34. Constitution of the Crow Tribe (adopted 24 June 1948, approved 23 May 1949). The Crow
Constitution has been changed by amendment several times since adoption, a difficult task since the
Crow Tribal Council is the entire tribe.
35. The Crow Constitution limits tribal jurisdiction to the reservation; a great portion of the Tribe's
coal resource is in the ceded strip. The Crow own the mineral rights but not the surface. There have
been several attempts to redefine the reservation to include the ceded strip as part of the reservation.
36. See discussion at notes 47-51 infra and accompanying text.
37. 25 U.S.C. §636 (1976).
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scope to those passed by the Jicarilla Apache. Numerous lawsuits are
pending that test the validity of these taxes.38 Most of these suits were
stayed with the fond hope that the Supreme Court in Merrion would
provide definitive guidelines for resolution. However, the Court's reaffirmance of the inherent tax power of tribes changes the focus of the
litigation from inherent tribal power to Secretarial control. Plaintiffs must
show that there is either a general power of the Secretary of the Interior
to approve tribal tax ordinances which exist regardless of the organic
documents of the tribe or that the mineral leasing acts and federal regulation create a specific power to approve these types of ordinances.
A general power of the Secretary to approve the internal laws of tribes
has always been denied by the United States. In PhillipsPetroleum Company v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, the United States has requested that it
be dismissed as a party to the suit:
It is the position of the federal defendants that the Secretary of the
Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs have no authority to
approve, or disapprove, the resolutions. Therefore we contend, and
plaintiffs have not alleged otherwise, that action by the federal defendants in relation39to these taxes has no effect on the validity vel
non of these taxes.
While the capacity to have such a power is within the plenary legislative
power of the United States, neither the legislative nor executive branches
of the government has exercised the right. Tribes are free to structure
their government and govern their internal affairs without federal approval.
To find a general power would cut against the historical development
of federal Indian law. The movement since the passage of the IRA has
been to increase the degree of tribal management of its own affairs. 40
This trend is reflected in all aspects of Indian affairs; for instance, there
38. See Southland Royalty Co., v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, No. C79-0140 (D.C. Utah 1980)
(memorandum opinion on motion to dismiss of the Navajo defendants). The Motion to Dismiss was
denied as to the claims alleging Secretarial approval. This is one of many cases controlled by the
memorandum opinion and order: Phillips Petroleum Co v. Navajo Tribe of Nations, No. C79-0153,
Superior Oil Co. v. Navajo Tribe of Nations, No. C79-0237 and Texaco, Inc. et al. v. Navajo Tribe
of Nations, No. C79-0296.
39. Brief for Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Navajo Tribe of
Indians, No. C79-0153, at 2 (1980).
40. See generally: The Indian Financing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1453, 1461-1469, 1481-1498, 1511-1512, 1521-1524, 1541-1543 (1976))
(established a revolving load fund and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to insure loans to
Indians); Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-638, 88
Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§450-450n, 455-458 (1976)) (authorized Federal officials to
contract with and make grants to Indian tribes and organizations to perform federal services); The
Tribal Federal Jurisdiction Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-635, 80 Stat. 880 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362 (1976)) (authorized the tribes access to Federal district courts in cases where the U.S. Attorney
declines to bring the action).
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is legislation proposed to allow tribes greater freedom in controlling their
mineral resources.4 To find a general power reversing that trend would
be nonsense.
The broadest statement on the Secretary's power to manage Indian
affairs is 25 U.S.C. § 2,42 but this has been construed to mean the management of the Federal/Indian relationship itself, not internal tribal government. 3 Felix Cohen has likened this power to the power of the Secretary
of State to manage foreign affairs; the Secretarial mandate refers to the
relationship, not to the internal affairs of foreign countries."
Part of the confusion over the role of the Secretary of the Interior in
Indian affairs stems from confusing management and trust obligations
that impose a specific standard of conduct in certain areas with the plenary
legislative power of the United States.45 While Congress may grant general
approval power to the Secretary, until it does, Secretarial conduct is
limited to that which has been specificaly delegated by statute.46
Although it is generally conceded that no general approval power exists,
the Merrion case does raise the possibility that the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1938 and regulations enacted pursuant to the Act may create a specific
power to approve tax ordinances that would tax minerals extracted pursuant to a lease. The argument that the Act itself creates a specific power
flows from the language quoted earlier where the Court explains the
relationship between the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 and the IRA.47
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, while not formally part of the IRA,
was a continuation of the same policies of economic independence and
self-government. It was intended to bring order out of the chaos that had
resulted from a hodgepodge of laws passed over an extended period of
time to control Indian minerals. Further, the Act was to be another piece
of comprehensive federal policy.48 One of the rights guaranteed under the
IRA was that they could, in crtain circumstances, develop mineral development schemes that would not necessarily provide for public auction
of minerals. It would make little sense if the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938
would nullify those schemes that had been established four years earlier
41. S. 1894, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982) (a bill which would allow tribes more flexible mineral
development).
42. "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior,
and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian
Affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian relations." 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
43. See: Francis v. Francis, 203 U.S. 233 (1906); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899).
44. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 102 (1945).
45. Compare United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) with United States v. Mitchell, 445
U.S. 535 (1980).
46. See Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
47. Supra note 27.
48. For a discussion of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 and the IRA, see Crow Tribe of Indians
v. State of Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 1981).
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under the IRA. Therefore, Congress, in passing the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1938, ensured that rights guaranteed under provision of the IRA would
be saved. As the Tenth Circuit Court in Merrion noted, the tribes may
"define for themselves the leasing process. "4 9 This is an accurate reading
of the provision in 25 U.S.C. §396b, cited within the quote.5 0
The Court was clear; the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 is not a bar to
tribal taxation. To find that the savings provision in section 396b limits
that bar to IRA tribes or imposes Secretarial power would be an absurd
result.
One final issue in Merrion should be kept in mind. The recognition of
the tribes' right to tax is not a source of money that will turn Indian
reservations into American sheikdoms. Tribes may only get "x" number
of dollars for resources; those dollars may be denominated royalties or
taxes. While the denomination may have consequence to the non-Indian
lessees, it will not increase the total revenue for the tribe in the future
mineral agreements. Unless the state is ousted from the reservation, the
effect will be to limit reservation resource development. Tribal taxes will
now be computed into the equation as other costs. In those instances
where minerals are already being extracted and a tax is imposed, the
tribe's ability to levy a tax will still depend on the economic feasibility
of the project. Tribes in exercising their taxing power of those existing
projects should take note of both Aesop's admonitions and Justice Black's
dissent in FederalPower Comm'n v. TuscaroraIndian Nation, "that great
nations like great men should keep their word." 5 '

49. 617 F.2d 537, 559 (10th Cir. 1980).
50. Supra note 27.
51. 362 U.S. 99, 140 (1960).

